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IN PURSUIT OF SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE OCC'S
ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING STANDARD
Diana McMonagle*
To borrow a concept from the animal kingdom . . . a classic
predator traps the unwary and preys on the weak. Put in the
lending context, a predatory lender ensnares ... vulnerable cus-
tomers, offering loan products designed to prey on their weak-
ness, bleed them financially and . . . strip them of their most
precious possessions.1
PROLOGUE
George Campbell lived his entire life in the same home in
Queens, New York.' Disabled, living solely on monthly Supple-
mental Security Income checks, Mr. Campbell had one significant
financial asset: the value of his home appreciated substantially over
the years and he amassed considerable equity in the property.3 A
few years ago, an aggressive mortgage broker persuaded Mr.
Campbell to take out a second mortgage to finance much-needed
repairs.4 The broker claimed Mr. Campbell, with neither a check-
ing account nor an established credit history, was ineligible for a
bank loan.5 Unable to read well, Mr. Campbell did not understand
his obligations under the agreement; like countless other unsus-
pecting borrowers in the United States, Mr. Campbell became the
victim of a predatory lender.6 The terms of the mortgage required
* J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2005; B.A., Political Sci-
ence, Fordham University, 2001. I wish to thank Professor Susan Block-Lieb for in-
troducing me to the topic of predatory lending and for her invaluable guidance in
developing my ideas. Special thanks to Christiana Brennan for her constructive ad-
vice and ceaseless encouragement. This Comment is dedicated to my family, Karen,
Jack, and Kristen McMonagle, whom I credit for all my accomplishments.
1. Julie L. Williams & Michael S. Bylsma, The Predatory Lending Challenge, 61
MORTGAGE BANKING 117, 118 (2000).
2. See, Dennis Hevesi, New Curbs on Predatory Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
2002, at 1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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monthly payments almost equal to Mr. Campbell's social security
income.7 Predictably, he defaulted.8
INTRODUCTION
Predatory lenders are unscrupulous, aggressively marketing their
loans to borrowers who cannot afford their credit on the onerous
terms offered. Their prey are some of the most vulnerable mem-
bers of society: the elderly, persons living in low-income areas, the
socially and economically disadvantaged, the financially unsophisti-
cated. The consequences are devastating, and include enormous
personal losses, foreclosures on homes, and the devastation that
foreclosure brings to entire neighborhoods. Many common abu-
sive lending practices are already illegal under federal law,9 yet
predatory lending continues to destroy communities. 10
In response to this escalating problem, the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency ("OCC"), a federal regulator of the na-
tional banking industry, issued a Final Rule on January 7, 2004
("Final Rule").11 The OCC has always prohibited banks from en-
gaging in predatory lending, but difficulties defining "predatory"
and the problematic application of conflicting state-lending laws
has caused significant supervisory and enforcement problems. 2
The Final Rule addresses these problems and sets forth a uniform
federal standard to guide banking policies on predatory practices
and to aid regulators' identification of predatory loans. 3 The Final
Rule forbids national banks from making consumer loans, includ-
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1914)
(prohibiting deceptive and unfair trade practices); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1666 (1968) (imposing disclosure requirements in lending); Home Ownership
and Equity Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (1994) (protecting against certain high-
rate and high-fee loans); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(3) (2002) (prohibiting
loan flipping under certain circumstances).
10. See Hevesi, supra note 2.
11. Bank Activities and Operations, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008 (2004); Real Estate Lend-
ing and Appraisals, 12 C.F.R. § 34.3 (2004).
12. See Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Issues Fi-
nal Rules on National Bank Preemption and Visitorial Powers; Includes Strong Stan-
dard to Keep Predatory Lending Out of National Banks (Jan. 7, 2004) [hereinafter
OCC Final Rule Press Release], available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/scripts/New-
sRelease.aspx?Doc=ZN918H7T.xml. Before promulgation of the Final Rule, national
banks were subject to state as well as federal anti-predatory lending laws. Id. This
caused regulatory problems for banks with branches in states with inconsistent laws.
Id.
13. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008, 34.3.
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ing mortgage loans, car loans, and student loans, 4 based predomi-
nantly on the foreclosure value of the borrower's collateral.15 The
rationale lies in the OCC's belief that the value of a borrower's
collateral does not indicate their ability to repay the loan. As a
result, such loans are now per se predatory, and for that reason,
prohibited. 6
The Final Rule also preempts several categories of state banking
laws 7 that are no longer enforceable against national banks.'
8
States now have little authority to regulate the lending practices of
those national banks situated within their jurisdictions.19 Specifi-
cally, the Final Rule preempts state regulation of lending licenses,
loan terms, interest rates, terms of credit, disclosure requirements,
and other conditions of lending.2" The Final Rule also codifies the
judge-made determination that the OCC has authority to enforce
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act")2 and
regulations thereunder against unfair and deceptive trade practices
in banking.22
Effectively, as a result of the Final Rule national banks are no
longer subject to state anti-predatory lending laws.23 The OCC
14. See Memorandum from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Pre-
emption Final Rule Questions and Answers 7 (Jan. 7, 2004), available at
http://www.occ.treas.go4/2004-3dPreemptionQNAs.pdf.
15. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008, 34.3.
16. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008, 34.3.
17. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008(d), 34.4(a). Pursuant to the National Bank Act, the
OCC has authority to issue preemption regulation. 12 U.S.C. § 93(a); see also CSBS
v. Conover, 710 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency has authority under the National Bank Act to issue regulations preempting
state laws that are inconsistent with national banking activities).
18. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007-7.4009. The OCC's authority to preempt state laws
that place limitations and restrictions on national banks is based on constitutional
principles under the Supremacy Clause. See McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316
(1819) (applying the doctrine of preemption to banking regulation).
19. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008. The Final Rule also identifies those state laws that are
not preempted. State laws that only incidentally affect lending are not preempted,
including state regulation over matters pertaining to contract law, debt collection
remedies, zoning restrictions, tort law, rules for the transfer of property, tax law, crim-
inal law, and homestead rights. Id.; 12 C.F.R. §34.4(b).
20. See 12 C.F.R. § 34.4.
21. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1914). The Final
Rule gives the OCC authority to enforce the FTC Act. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008(c),
34.3(c). Yet, the OCC's authority is limited to enforcement alone and the Federal
Reserve maintains exclusive authority to promulgate rules and regulations under the
FTC Act. § 15 U.S.C. 45(a).
22. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008(c), 34.3(c).
23. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008, 34.4.
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standard has replaced a multitude of state laws, and national banks
are now only accountable to the OCC and its single standard.24
This Comment will analyze the potential ineffectiveness and pos-
sible consequences of the OCC's anti-predatory lending standard
and argue that, despite the perceived comfort in having a single
federal standard for evaluating predatory lending, the standard set
forth in the Final Rule is inadequate, and inherently flawed.
Part I of this Comment attempts to define predatory lending and
distinguishes predatory lending from non-predatory subprime
lending. Part I also explains the OCC's role in regulating preda-
tory lending. 6 Part II examines the standard set forth in the Final
Rule and analyzes it in light of the agency's justifications for adopt-
ing the rule,27 which include agency concerns for the maintenance
of the safety and soundness of the national banking system and the
goal of ensuring fair and equal access to financial services for all
Americans. 8 Part II concludes that the OCC's preemption of state
anti-predatory lending laws and substitution of a single anti-preda-
tory lending standard cannot reasonably be justified on these
grounds.29 Part II also explores the potential negative social and
economic consequences that this regulation may have for low-in-
come borrowers.3 ° Part II suggests that this effect may increase the
predatory lending problem by forcing these individuals to seek sub-
prime loans from the largely unregulated non-bank sector, the seg-
ment of the financial industry notorious for committing predatory
lending. 31 Part III proposes a solution to ameliorate the potential
social and economic costs of the regulation.32 It suggests that the
OCC should interpret and enforce the regulation so that it only
prohibits loans extended with a calculated intent to foreclose, and
provides guidelines for determining a bank's intent.33
24. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008(e), 34.4(b).
25. See infra notes 34-65 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 66-88 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 89-165 and. accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 99-165 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 109-33, 139-65 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 151-65 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
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I. PREDATORY LENDING IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET AND THE
ROLE OF THE OCC
A. Defining the Problem
John D. Hawke, Comptroller of the Currency, defines predatory
lending as "the aggressive marketing of credit to people who sim-
ply cannot afford it."'34 This may be an oversimplification. Other
commentators argue that the term in fact applies to a catalogue of
exploitative lending practices that generally fall into one of two
categories.3 1 The first consists of illegal and unconscionable lend-
ing tactics, such as forging signatures on loan documents, fraudu-
lently misrepresenting the terms of a loan, double billing, hidden
fees, and charging for services that were never rendered. 36 The
second category addresses activities which are not as obviously
abusive--legal lending practices which are misused by unprinci-
pled lenders. This includes loan flipping,37 equity stripping, 38 high
interest rates and hidden fees, 39 among other abusive lending prac-
tices. 40 Still others believe that the term defies traditional defini-
34. John D. Hawke, Jr., Remarks Before The Federalist Society (July 24, 2003),
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2003-57a.pdf.
35. See Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization,
and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 513 (2002).
36. Id.
37. Loan flipping is the frequent refinancing of a loan, where the service fees and
credit insurance costs are financed by the loan so that the principal continually rises,
even as the borrower makes payments on the loan. For a discussion of the Federal
Reserve Board's attempt to curb predatory loan flipping, see Michael J. Pyle, Com-
ment, A "Flip" Look at Predatory Lending: Will the Fed's Revised Regulation Z End
Abusive Refinancing Practices?, 112 YALE L.J. 1919, 1924 (2003) (analyzing the Fed-
eral Reserve Board's Regulation Z prohibiting certain forms of loan flipping).
38. In mortgage lending, equity stripping refers to two related practices. One is
the practice of lending to individuals with considerable equity in their home who have
no means to repay the loan. See Better Business Bureau, Beware of Predatory Prac-
tices in Home Mortgage Lending, at http://bbb.org/alerts/article.asp?ID=240 (last vis-
ited Nov. 4, 2004). When the homeowner defaults the lender forecloses and sells the
home, stripping the borrower of his equity. Id. The term also applies to the practice
where lenders charge excessive fees at closing that are paid out of the borrower's
equity. See ERIC STEIN, QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COST OF PREDATORY LEND-
ING 4 (2001), available at http://www.predatorylending.org/pdfs/Quantl0-01.pdf. This
practice is particularly deceptive because when paid out of equity the borrower "does
not feel the pain of counting out thousands of dollars in cash. The borrower parts
with the money only later, when the loan is paid off and the equity value remaining in
his or her home is reduced by the amount of fees owed." Id.
39. See Eggert, supra note 35, at 513.
40. See, e.g., id. at 512-14; ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZERS FOR RE-
FORM Now, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002: PREDATORY LENDING IN AMERICA
(2002) (outlining the scope of predatory lending in the subprime market) [hereinafter
ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002], available at http://www.acorn.org/
index.php?id=102.
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tion, since it encompasses loan terms and products that, on their
face, are impossible to differentiate from legitimate lending prac-
tices.4 1 These commentators instead characterize predatory lend-
ing on a "you know [it] when you see it" 42 basis, recognizing that
any practice "targeted at vulnerable populations [that causes] dev-
astating personal losses, including bankruptcy, poverty, and fore-
closure" is predatory.43
Another problem in defining predatory lending arises because
predatory lending occurs primarily in the subprime market. 44 Sub-
prime loans are loans with higher interest rates designed for bor-
rowers who would not qualify for loans at the prime rate because
of a blemished, or nonexistent, credit history.45 The emergence
and growth of the subprime market is considered a national eco-
nomic success, 4 6 and has given low-income borrowers access to
credit where they did not have access before. 47 By allowing fami-
lies and individuals who are ineligible for prime rate loans to ob-
tain subprime rate mortgages, the increased availability of
subprime credit has been critical in aiding a recent increase in rates
of homeownership.48 Subprime lending has also been credited with
increasing mortgage lending to minority borrowers, particularly
Hispanics and African-Americans during the 1990s. 49 The difficult
question is whether regulators can proscribe predatory lending
while at the same time encouraging beneficial subprime lending.
While not all subprime lenders are predatory, nearly all preda-
tory loans are subprime.50 Although predatory loans constitute
only a subset of subprime lending, the whole is sometimes mis-
41. See Eggert, supra note 35, at 513.
42. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law
and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1260 (2002).
43. Id.
44. See id. at 1261.
45. See id.
46. See ROBERT E. LITAN, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: THE RISKS OF PREMA-
TURE STATE REGULATION OF PREDATORY LENDING (2003) (noting that national sub-
prime mortgage originations increased from $34 billion in 1994 to over $173 billion in
2001), available at http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/D881716A-1C75-11D5-AB7B-
00508B95258D/28871/PredReport200991.pdf.
47. See Charles W. Calomiris & Robert E. Litan, Homeownership That's Too Im-
portant to Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2001, at A17.
48. Cf. Litan, supra note 46, at 4 (noting that subprime mortgage lending in-
creased from $34 billion in 1994 to over $160 billion in 1999).
49. See id.
50. Prepared Testimony of John. D. Hawke, Jr. Comptroller of the Currency:
Before the House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. (May 24, 2000)
[hereinafter Testimony of Comptroller Hawke].
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taken for the part, resulting in an overly-broad and inaccurate defi-
nition.5 1 A primary distinction between subprime and predatory
lending lies in the lender's intent in extending the loan.52 Preda-
tory lenders profit from intentionally and systematically taking ad-
vantage of unsophisticated borrowers, and purposefully structure
loans to cause economic harm to the borrower--at a significant
profit for the lender.5 3 Non-predatory subprime lenders lend with
a different intent, that is, to provide valuable credit to individuals
with a higher risk of default. The higher interest and foreclosure
rates that accompany subprime loans result from the additional
risk inherent in lending to an individual with imperfect credit, not
from intentional planning on the part of the lender. The substance
of "ground level" interactions between the lender and the bor-
rower is often indicative of a lender's intent.54 Some lenders inten-
tionally seek out vulnerable loan candidates,55 going so far as to
review public property lien records to find homeowners with seri-
ous debt. 6 After identifying their victims, these lenders become
salesmen, aggressively promoting loans that the frequently desper-
ate borrowers cannot afford.
Predatory lenders prey on the most vulnerable members of soci-
ety.5 7 Their typical victims are financially unsophisticated individu-
als 58 who are often "disconnected" from the traditional credit
51. See id.
52. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1260. Engel & McCoy have set forth a
list of five characteristics that distinguish predatory lending from legitimate subprime
lending:
1) loans structured to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to
borrowers,
2) harmful rent seeking,
3) loans involving fraud or deceptive practices,
4) other forms of lack of transparency in loans that are not actionable as
fraud, and
5) loans that require borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress.
Id.
53. See id.
54. Williams & Bylsma, supra note 1, at 118.
55. Intentionally targeting low-income borrowers for high cost loans is commonly
referred to as "reverse redlining." See Anne-Marie Motto, Note, Skirting the Law:
How Predatory Mortgage Lenders Are Destroying the American Dream, 18 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 859, 860-61 (2002).
56. See Sandra Block, Guidelines Can Help Reduce Risk of Foreclosure, USA To-
DAY, Sept. 20, 2002, at 3B.
57. Cf. ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEOUAL 2002, supra note 40, at 1 (showing
that the poor and minorities are victims of predatory lending at significantly higher
rates than white and more affluent individuals).
58. See Michelle W. Lewis, Perspectives on Predatory Lending: The Philadelphia
Experience, 12 J. AFFORDABLE Hous. & CMTY. DEV. L. 491, 508 (2003). Financially
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economy,59 in that they have limited experience with banks and
often have not developed an official credit history.6" Often, these
borrowers have relied on the "fringe" credit market: check cashing
establishments, pawnshops, and other local businesses that offer
credit and limited financial services at significantly higher fees than
traditional banks.61
Victims of predatory lending are also generally from low-income
communities. 62 This is partly because low-income borrowers often
seek loans when they are desperate for cash, and may not have the
information or ability to properly compare lenders,63 making them
more susceptible to aggressive predatory lenders.64 In addition,
this class of borrowers makes up a greater percentage of the class
of victims adversely affected by predatory lenders, because low-
income individuals generally have fewer resources than more afflu-
ent individuals, and are more liable to default.65
B. The Role of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Concerns about the growth of predatory lending abuses
prompted action by the OCC,66 a bureau of the U.S. Department
of the Treasury charged with regulating the national banking sys-
tem.67 The OCC, under the direction of Comptroller Hawke, char-
ters new banks and has exclusive "visitorial powers" to examine
and supervise the affairs of existing national banks.68 Its primary
goal is to maintain stability and fair competition within the banking
system. 69 The agency breaks this goal down into four objectives.
The first is to ensure the safety and soundness of the national bank-
unsophisticated victims fall into three categories: "[T]hose who know too little (who
need education and information), those who know too much (who are afraid to ask
questions), and those who expect something for nothing (who are attracted to
promises of 'buy now, don't pay until 2005')." Id.
59. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1281.
60. For purposes of this Comment, "official credit history" refers to an individual's
credit history as recorded on their credit report.
61. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1281.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 1282.
64. Id. at 1281-82.
65. Id.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 5-18.
67. See The National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 93 (1864) (authorizing the Comptrol-
ler to hire a staff to supervise and examine national banks).
68. See 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2004).
69. See About the OCC, at http://www.occ.treas.gov/aboutocc.htm (last visited
Nov. 16, 2004).
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ing system.7" That is, to maintain the financial health of banks and
the integrity of the banking system.71 Second, the agency aims to
foster competition by allowing banks to offer new products and
services. 72 The third goal is to improve the efficiency and effective-
ness of the OCC.73 Finally, the agency strives to ensure fair and
equal access to financial services for all Americans.74 This Com-
ment focuses on the first and last of these objectives.
The OCC is not the sole federal regulator of the national bank-
ing system. 75 The Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation also have regulatory authority.76 Banks pick
their primary regulator when they elect to have either a national or
a state charter.77 The OCC is responsible for the nationally
chartered banks,78 whereas the Federal Reserve and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation regulate -the state chartered
banks. 79 Some commentators believe that this competition influ-
ences the substance of banking regulations ° because banks' ability
to choose their regulator creates a competitive atmosphere 81 by
"enabl[ing] banking organizations to shop for the most lenient reg-
ulator."'82 These commentators believe that this competition fuels
a "race to the bottom, '83 where the regulators, in an attempt to
70. See id.
71. Safety and soundness regulations aim to control a bank's exposure to risk,
often by imposing financial safeguards such as minimum capital requirements and
limitations on risky endeavors. See JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAW AND
REGULATION 75 (3d ed. 2001).
72. See About the OCC, supra note 69.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 70.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 75; see also John A. Weinberg, Competition Among Bank Regulators,
88 FED. RES. BANK RICHMOND ECON. Q. 19 (2002).
78. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 70.
79. State chartered banks are also subject to regulation by the state in which they
are chartered. See Weinberg, supra note 77, at 19.
80. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 70.
81. See Weinberg, supra note 77, at 19.
82. MACEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 74-75.
83. Weinberg, supra note 77, at 20 (discussing how proposals to restructure and
consolidate bank regulation are partly based on the idea that regulators are currently
engaged in a race to the bottom). But see RICHARD J. ROSEN, Do REGULATORS
SEARCH FOR THE QUIET LIFE? THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REGULATORS AND THE
REGULATED IN BANKING (2001) (explaining that competition can be beneficial, as
banks tend to improve their performance following a switch from one regulator to
another and that under certain conditions, regulatory competition leads to optimal
standard setting), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/workingpapers/
papers/wp2001-05.pdf.
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attract new banks to their constituency and to retain the banks that
they already regulate, 84 will comply with industry demands.85
Commentators claim that this often results in regulations that dis-
proportionately favor the industry at the expense of the agency's
interest in managing bank operations86 and the public interest.87
The OCC is particularly susceptible to the pressures of competition
because, unlike most federal agencies, it is funded entirely by the
banks it regulates, in the form of examination fees. 88
II. T;IE OCC's RESPONSE TO THE PREDATORY
LENDING PROBLEM
The OCC has made clear its position that predatory lending
practices "whether in connection with mortgage lending or other
national bank activities ... have no place in the national banking
system. '8 9 Such practices are inconsistent with the agency's goals
of fair access to credit for all Americans, community development
and renewal, and increased opportunities for homeownership. 90
In February 2003, the OCC issued an Advisory Letter addressing
its views on predatory lending ("Advisory Letter"). 91 The Advi-
sory Letter communicated the OCC's position that predatory lend-
ing would not be tolerated in the banking system.92 It provided
banks with notice of what practices the agency considered preda-
tory, and guidlines for avoiding the purchase of predatory loans
originated by third parties.93 It also advised banks as to what lend-
84. See Weinberg, supra note 77, at 20.
85. See, e.g., Congressional Review of OCC Preemption: Before the House Comm.
on Fin. Servs. Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 108th Cong. (2004) (state-
ment of Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa), available at http://financialser-
vices.house.gov/media/pdf/012804tm.pdf.
86. See Weinberg, supra note 77, at 20.
87. See ROSEN, supra note 83, at 5.
88. MACEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 70. Since the agency's budget depends exclu-
sively on the number of banks it regulates, there is a great incentive for the OCC to
make its regulations lenient and favorable to industry, so as not to lose "market
share" to another regulator. Id. at 75; see also Jess Bravin & Paul Beckett, Dependent
on Lenders' Fees, the OCC Takes Banks Side Against Local Laws, WALL ST. J., Jan.
28, 2002, at Al.
89. Bank Activities and Operations, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008 (20g4); Real Estate Lend-
ing and Appraisals, 12 C.F.R. § 34.3 (2004).
90. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Advisory Letter 2003-2,
Guidelines for National Banks to Guard Against Predatory and Abusive Lending
Practices (Feb. 21, 2003) [hereinafter OCC Advisory Letter 2003-2], available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2003-2.pdf.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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ing practices may be considered unfair and deceptive under Section
5 of the FTC Act.94 According to the Comptroller, the purpose of
the Advisory Letter was to provide guidance "to deal effectively
with predatory lending without setting up a rigid system that cre-
ates burdens and obstacles to serve low-income customers. 95
Despite the Comptroller's previous interest in avoiding a "rigid
system," the OCC issued the Final Rule on January 7, 2004,96 con-
tradicting its previously stated intent.97 The Rule sets forth a single
anti-predatory lending standard ("Standard"), which provides that
"[a] national bank shall not make a consumer loan . . . based
predominantly on the bank's realization of the foreclosure or liqui-
dation value of the borrower's collateral, without regard to the bor-
rower's ability to repay the loan according to its terms." 98 Notably
missing from the rule is any reference to the bank's intent in ex-
tending the loan. Under the Standard a lender who intends to take
advantage of a borrower is treated the same as a lender who lends
in the possibly negligent, though earnest, hope that the borrower
will be able to fulfill the terms of the loan.
A. Analysis of the Standard and the OCC's Objectives
The OCC relies on two agency objectives in support of its adop-
tion of the Final Rule: the maintenance of the safety and soundness
of the national banking system, and the provision of fair and equal
access to financial services for all Americans.
94. Id. According to the Advisory Letter, practices may be labeled deceptive if
"[t]here is a representation, omission, act or practice that is likely to mislead; [t]he act
or practice would likely mislead a reasonable consumer [in the targeted audience];
and the representation, omission, act, or practice is likely to mislead in a material
way." Id. In addition, a practice may be labeled unfair for purposes of the FTC Act if
"[t]he practice causes substantial consumer injury such as monetary harm; [tihe injury
is not outweighed by benefits to the consumer or to competition; and the [ilnjury
caused by the practice is one that consumers could not reasonably have avoided." Id.
95. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Issues Guide-
lines to National Banks to Guard Against Abusive Lending Practices; Invites Com-
ments on Request to Determine that Georgia Law is Preempted (Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.occ.treas.govlscripts/newsrelease.aspx?Doc=EMRDRG7D.
xml.
96. The Final Rule amends Bank Activities and Operations, 12 C.F.R. § 7 (2003),
and Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 12 C.F.R. § 34 (2003).
97. Administrative rules promulgated through the notice and comment process (as
was this OCC Final Rule) are considered "legislative," are binding as law on the regu-
lated industry, and are given Chevron deference during judicial review. See Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). By contrast, Ad-
visory Letters are nonbinding and do not carry the force of law.
98. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008, 34.3.
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1. Principles of Safety and Soundness
The OCC relied upon a safety and soundness rationale for pre-
empting state regulation of national banks. The Comptroller
stated that
"[w~hen national banks are unable to operate under uniform,
consistent and predictable standards, their business suffers and
so does the safety and soundness of the national banking sys-
tem .... The application of multiple and often unpredictable
state laws interferes with their ability to plan and manage their
business, as well as their ability to serve the people ... and the
economy of the United States."99
Safety and soundness goals are common to all of the federal bank
regulators.'00 In general terms, maintaining safety and soundness
refers to maintenance of the financial health of banks and the in-
tegrity of the banking system.' 0l Safety and soundness regulations
aim to control a bank's exposure to risk, often by imposing finan-
cial safeguards such as minimum capital requirements, limitations
on risky lending, and other safeguards.
10 2
The OCC also relied on a safety and soundness rationale for
adopting the Standard. The press release that accompanied the Fi-
nal Rule states: "The prohibition on basing loans on the foreclo-
sure value of the borrower's collateral is grounded in safety and
soundness principles. 1 0 3 As applied to predatory lending, the
OCC takes the position that loans extended with the expectation of
foreclosing on the borrower's collateral for repayment are inher-
ently unsafe and unsound10 4 because loans extended in reliance on
the foreclosure value of the borrower's collateral carry a greater
risk of default than loans extended after a careful calculation of the
borrower's ability to repay through future income and other finan-
cial resources.' The OCC believes that repeat origination or
purchase of such loans from brokers would constitute a threat to
the safety and soundness of the banking system because these
loans carry a high risk of default, 6 and defaults expose a bank to
loss when the sale of the collateral does not cover the balance of
99. OCC Final Rule Press Release, supra note 12.
100. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 75.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. OCC Final Rule Press Release, supra note 12.
104. Bank Activities and Operations, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008 (2004); Real Estate Lend-
ing and Appraisals, 12 C.F.R. § 34.3 (2004).
105. OCC Final Rule Press Release, supra note 12.
106. OCC Advisory Letter 2003-2, supra note 90.
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the loan after accounting for all the costs associated with liquida-
tion.'0 7 Yet, while safety and soundness concerns may justify the
preemption of state laws, they do not justify the adoption of the
Standard. Predatory lending is not prevalent in the national bank-
ing system, and therefore is not a significant threat to its Safety and
Soundness. Furthermore, application of the Standard will not pro-
hibit most predatory lending practices.
a. Most National Banks Are Not Engaged in Predatory Lending
Many American communities are plagued by predatory lend-
ing, 10 8 but national banks are not the primary offenders because
most national banks do not originate predatory loans.10 9 Accord-
ing to the Comptroller, there are only "isolated cases of abusive
practices" 0 among regulated banks.1 ' The Standard is a "pre-
ventative measure," to ensure regulated banks do not become in-
volved in predatory lending.1 2
The OCC has also expressed concerns that national banks could
inadvertently facilitate predatory lending by purchasing predatory
loans from brokers and other third parties.1 3 This is a legitimate
concern and was addressed by the OCC in its February 2003 Advi-
sory Letter. 14 The Advisory Letter outlined common abusive
lending practices and advised banks to exercise caution in purchas-
ing brokered and third party originated loans." 5 The OCC urged
national banks only to do business with companies that have strong
anti-predatory lending policies in connection with loans they sell or
pool for securitization. 116
107. Id.
108. See generally, ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002, supra note 34 (docu-
menting the increase in predatory lending that has accompanied increased subprime
lending).
109. See James M. Rockett, Contradictory Laws, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 1, 2003, at 47
(stating that consumer advocates do not cite national banks as predatory lenders); see
also Spitzer Threatens to Sue U.S. Regulator Over Loan Exemption, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
11, 2003, at C7 ("According to [a spokesman for the OCC] most of the predatory
lending occurs among non-bank institutions"). But see Michael Hudson, Banking on
Misery: Citigroup, Wall Street, and the Fleecing of the South, S. EXPOSURE (2003) (dis-
cussing Citigroup's involvement in predatory lending), available at
http://www.southernstudies.org/reports/bankingonmisery.pdf.
110. OCC Final Rule Press Release, supra note 12.
111. But see Hudson, supra note 109 (noting charges of predatory lending against
Citigroup).
112. See OCC Final Rule Press Release, supra note 12.
113. See OCC Advisory Letter 2003-2, supra note 90.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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b. Application of the Standard Will Not Prohibit Most Predatory
Lending Practices
For those isolated cases where national banks engage in preda-
tory lending,1" 7 the Standard will do little to stop them. As dis-
cussed earlier, defining predatory lending is difficult because it
consists of a multitude of abusive lending practices. 118 Application
of the Standard will only prohibit one practice, equity stripping,
where a lender extends a loan to a borrower who has no reasona-
ble means to repay, and upon the anticipated default, the lender
forecloses on the collateral and strips whatever equity remains in
the property." 9 Comptroller Hawke has referred to equity strip-
ping as "the most egregious aspect of predatory lending,"'120 be-
cause it involves a deliberate seizure of the borrower's collateral
and the valuable equity therein. A lender, who is aware that the
borrower cannot afford the loan but extends the loan anyway, an-
ticipating the borrower's default, is in clear violation of the
Standard.
Application of the Standard will do little to prohibit other preda-
tory practices in secured lending. It will not prohibit lenders from
charging unjustifiably high interest rates and service fees, so long as
it is reasonable for the bank to believe that the borrower will be
able to repay the loan from future income. For the same reason,
the Standard will not affect loan packing, a practice in which credit
insurance premiums are incorporated into the principal and fi-
nanced over the span of the loan. 2 1 (This practice is labeled pred-
atory when the lender either does not inform the borrower of the
cost of the insurance and/or that it is optional.) 2 2 Similarly, it will
have no effect on negative amortization, where the borrower's
principal balance increases monthly because the scheduled pay-
ments are so low that they do not cover the monthly interest. 2 3 In
effect, onerous terms are permissible according to the OCC rule, so
long as the borrower can afford the monthly payments. Yet all
117. See, e.g., Hudson, supra note 109.
118. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
119. See id.
120. Statement of Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr. Regarding the
Issuance of Regulations Concerning Preemption and Visitorial Powers (Jan. 7, 2004)
[hereinafter Statement of Comptroller Hawke], available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/
2004-3aComptrollersstatement.pdf.
121. See Motto, supra note 55, at 864 ("[Olne noted subprime lender sets quotas on
credit insurance, which is 'pure profit,' mainly because the lender itself underwrites
it.").
122. See id.
123. See id. at 865.
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these practices are predatory; they take advantage of the borrower,
jeopardizing his financial welfare, at a significant profit for the
lender. 124
The OCC may be able to take action against such behaviors
under its FTC Act enforcement authority,2 5 if they qualify as un-
fair and deceptive trade practices under that Act.12 6 Yet, the effect
of this authority is questionable. Under the Act, the Federal Re-
serve Board has exclusive authority to promulgate regulations
against unfair and deceptive banking practices. 127 The OCC
merely has enforcement authority, the power to sanction national
banks for violating the Act. 28 Whether this authority will effec-
tively prohibit those types of predatory lending that are not pro-
scribed by the Standard depends largely on the OCC's use of the
authority. Strict enforcement of the Act is unlikely, because as
noted earlier, the competitive nature of banking regulation creates
a strong financial incentive for the OCC to support lenient regula-
tion as it derives all of its funding from the banks it regulates.129
Moreover, application of the Standard will not prohibit preda-
tory lending practices in unsecured lending. The Standard provides
that banks cannot grant a loan based predominantly on the "fore-
closure or liquidation value of the borrower's collateral, without
regard to the borrower's ability to repay. ' 130 Therefore, the Stan-
dard requires banks to investigate a borrower's ability to repay the
loan from income only when the bank is extending a secured
loan.1 3 1 The Standard is inapplicable to unsecured loans. 132 Ac-
cordingly, a bank can be in full compliance with the Standard yet
make unsecured loans to individuals who have no foreseeable
means to repay the debt.133
2. Fair and Equal Access to Financial Services
for All Americans
To further support the regulation, OCC representatives have
stated that the Standard is consistent with the agency's fair and
124. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1261 (explaining that loans structured to
result in serious financial harm to the borrower are predatory).
125. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008(c), 34.3(c).
126. 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1).
127. Id.
128. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008(c), 34.3(c).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 80-88.
130. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008(b), 34.3(b).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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equal access objectives and will not adversely affect access to finan-
cial services. 3 4 Comptroller Hawke argues that application of the
Standard will deal with the predatory lending problem without im-
peding access for low-income borrowers to legitimate subprime
credit.135 Hawke has also stated that predatory lending practices
are inconsistent with the OCC's fair-lending goals, 36 because they
are often discriminatory. Low-income individuals, minorities, and
the elderly are the most vulnerable to aggressive lending tactics
and are often specifically targeted by predatory lenders.137 By
combating predatory lending, the OCC hopes to reduce this dis-
crimination within the banking system,'138 but by squeezing banks
to prevent predatory lending, the OCC may unintentionally foster
the growth of predatory lending in minority communities.
a. The Pre-Standard Condition: An Unequal Distribution
of Financial Services
Individuals seeking subprime loans often do not have access to
legitimate subprime loans from banks for two reasons: banks often
do not service low-income neighborhoods,' 39 and those banks with
branches in low-income neighborhoods often do not offer sub-
prime loans.140 According to a study by the Association of Commu-
nity Organizations for Reform Now ("ACORN"), banks have
effectively abandoned low-income and minority communities.141
The study analyzed Federal Reserve data, and found that the num-
ber of branch offices in low and lower-middle class neighborhoods
fell twenty-one percent from 1975 to 1995, while the total number
of banks rose twenty-nine percent during that same time. 42 Physi-
134. See Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Takes
Steps to Keep Abusive Practices Out of National Banking System While Ensuring Con-
tinued Access to Credit for Low-Income Americans (July 31, 2003), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/scripts/newsrelease.aspx?Doc=9YWB2OJB.xml.
135. Id.
136. See Testimony of Comptroller Hawke, supra note 50.
137. See, e.g., Calomiris & Litan, supra note 47; Motto, supra note 55, at 860-61;
Spitzer Threatens to Sue U.S. Regulator Over Loan Exemption, supra note 109.
138. See Spitzer Threatens to Sue U.S. Regulator Over Loan Exemption, supra note
109.
139. See ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002, supra note 40.
140. Despite the growth of subprime lending, some banks remain cautious and
often unwilling to originate subprime mortgage loans. See Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, OCC Working Paper, Economic Issues in Predatory Lending, July,
2003 [hereinafter OCC Working Paper], available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/
workingpaper.pdf.
141. ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002, supra note 40.
142. Id.
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cal presence is important; the study notes that "the proximity of a
bank's branches to low and moderate income neighborhoods is di-
rectly related to the level of lending made by the bank in those
neighborhoods."' 43
Furthermore, national banks are not major players in the sub-
prime market. 144 Most subprime lenders are non-bank mortgage
and finance companies that are not regulated by the OCC14 (and
aside from consumer protection laws, are subject to little federal
regulation). A report by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD") shows that in 2001 only twenty percent of
the lenders whose business focus was subprime mortgage lending
were banks or their affiliates.1 46 Banks are cautious of extending
subprime credit, either because bank management is risk averse or
because they fear potential damage to the bank's reputation if they
lend to higher risk customers. 147
While finance companies and non-bank mortgage lenders extend
the majority of subprime credit, 48 some banks have realized the
value in subprime lending.1 49 The Center for Responsible Lending
("CRL") disagrees with the HUD analysis, stating "many of the
depository institutions doing primarily prime lending are also do-
ing some subprime lending. Given that many national banks are
prime mortgage originators, a national bank could be a large sub-
prime lender without being classified as such by HUD."' 50 The
predatory non-bank lenders, however, are present and thriving.
143. Id.
144. See OCC Working Paper, supra note 140, at 4 (noting that in 2001 there were
178 subprime mortgage lenders, and only 36 were banks or their affiliates); see also
Litan, supra note 46, at 6 (documenting the market share for the top twenty largest
subprime lenders for first quarter of 2002). Citigroup, however, is an exception to this
generalization. See generally Hudson, supra note 109 (documenting Citigroup's in-
volvement in predatory subprime lending).
145. See OCC Working Paper, supra note 140, at 5.
146. Id. at 4.
147. See Litan, supra note 46, at 5. Bank management is also wary of the increased
safety and soundness regulatory scrutiny that comes along with charging higher inter-
est rates and the increased foreclosure rates that often accompany subprime lending.
Id.; see also OCC Working Paper, supra note 136, at 4.
148. See supra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
149. Litan, supra note 40, at 4. Banks are becoming increasingly more involved in
the subprime market. Id. For the first quarter of 2002 only one of the top five sub-
prime lenders, comprising approximately sixty percent of the market share, was a
bank. Id. That bank, however, holds over twenty-one percent of the market share.
Id.
150. Center for Responsible Lending, Comments on OCC Working Paper, at 7,
available at http://www.predatorylending.org/pdfs/CRLCommentsonOCCWorking
Paper.pdf.
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b. The Standard May Further Impede Access to Legitimate
Subprime Credit
The OCC is aware that many state anti-predatory lending laws
have had the unintended effect of making non-predatory credit in-
accessible for many creditworthy subprime borrowers. 151 In an
analysis of the effect of state anti-predatory lending laws on na-
tional banks, both OCC and independent empirical studies docu-
ment the fact that these laws restrict the availability of credit to
subprime borrowers. 152 Specifically, after the enactment of North
Carolina's anti-predatory lending law in 1999,15 the origination of
subprime mortgages in North Carolina decreased by fourteen per-
cent,'54 and fell fifty percent for borrowers with incomes below
$25,000.155 Similarly, Chicago's anti-predatory lending drove many
seeking a subprime mortgage into the non-bank sector, 56 and in
Philadelphia, a law targeting predatory lenders caused many legiti-
mate subprime lenders to withdraw from the market. 57
The agency used these unintended effects of state anti-predatory
lending laws as support for its decision to preempt state regulation
of national banks.158  The OCC's position is that they were
"avoid[ing] the overbroad and unintended adverse effects of...
one-size-fits-all [state] laws.' 1 59 The OCC, however, has failed to
explain why the federal Standard will not similarly affect access to
legitimate subprime credit.
In addition to the geographic unavailability of banks, and the
general reluctance of banks to make subprime loans, application of
151. See Hawke, supra note 34; see also OCC Working Paper, supra note 140, at 20.
152. See ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002, supra note 40.
153. N.C. Sess. Law 1999-332 at §§ 1-5.
154. Gregory Elliehausen & Michael Staten, Credit Research Center Working Pa-
per No. 66, Regulation of Subprime Mortgage Products: An Analysis of North Caro-
lina's Predatory Lending Law (Nov. 2002), available at http://www.msb.edu/prog/crc/
pdf/RevisedWP66.pdf.
155. See Calomiris & Litan, supra note 47. But see ROBERTO G. QUERCIA ET AL.,
THE IMPACT OF NORTH CAROLINA'S ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING LAW: A DESCRIP-
TIVE ASSESSMENT (2003) (arguing that there was no reduction in access to credit for
subprime borrowers as a result of North Carolina's laws), available at
http://www.kenanflagler.unc.edu/assets/documents/CC-NC_-AntiPredatoryLaw
Impact.pdf.
156. Hawke, supra note 34.
157. Id.
158. See id. According to Comptroller Hawke, "[in] preemption situations, the
only relevant issue is whether the state law would impair or interfere with the national
bank's exercise of powers granted to it under federal law. If such an impact is found
to exist, federal law must prevail." Id.
159. Id.
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the Standard may act as an additional obstacle to legitimate sub-
prime credit. It has the potential to prohibit access to bank loans
for an entire class of individuals; those borrowers with equity in
their homes, or other valuable collateral, but with low incomes.
Recall the story about Mr. Campbell in the Prologue. 6 ' He is a
prime example of an equity-rich, cash-poor individual who, be-
cause of the new federal Standard, will not have access to subprime
credit from national banks. A bank complying with the Standard
might well deny his application for a loan, notwithstanding the con-
siderable equity in his home. First, even if the bank reasonably
believed that despite Mr. Campbell's low income he would be able
to make the payments on the loan, loan officers might be reluctant
to grant the loan to prevent any appearance that they were basing
the loan on the foreclosure value of his home. Extending a loan to
a borrower on a fixed income would send out a red flag for closer
OCC scrutiny of the bank's lending practices. Banks do not want
to risk an OCC audit, or be labeled a predatory lender, even if only
for the interim during an investigation; the effect could be devas-
tating and cause them to lose prime market customers.
Second, if the bank extended the loan, and was later forced to
foreclose on Mr. Campbell's home, an OCC investigation could po-
tentially reach a different conclusion than the bank as to Mr.
Campbell's ability to repay the loan from income. In hindsight, an
examination into the ability of a low-income individual to pay from
his income would seem questionable, especially in the case of many
low-income individuals who face unexpected interruptions in their
cash flow. For example, suppose circumstances arose where the
Social Security administration stopped Mr. Campbell's SSI checks
on the mistaken grounds that he was no longer disabled. Mr.
Campbell would lose his sole source of income, and have no option
but to default on the loan. The question is whether OCC examin-
ers would consider such an interruption in income foreseeable, and
conclude that the bank provided the loan despite Mr. Campbell's
uncertain future income.
The OCC's goal in adopting the Standard is to prohibit the
"most egregious" type of predatory lending: loans where the lender
grants the loan with the intent of foreclosing on the borrower's col-
lateral. 161 The potential result, however, will be to effectively ban
loans to otherwise eligible subprime borrowers who, despite low
incomes, have collateral that would traditionally support a loan.
160. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
161. See Statement of Comptroller Hawke, supra note 114.
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This cannot be reconciled with the OCC's objective of ensuring fair
and equal access to financial services for all Americans, at least as
it applies to low-income Americans.
c. The Potential to Increase Predatory Lending
The institutional denial of credit to this class of subprime bor-
rowers creates a larger pool of potential victims for the unscrupu-
lous lenders. When denied a bank loan, desperate borrowers turn
to the non-bank lenders, concentrated in low-income and minority
communities.162 A study by HUD found that subprime lending is
three times more prevalent in low-income communities than higher
income communities.1 63 Since these non-bank lenders are not sub-
ject to federal oversight and examination, there exists a great po-
tential for abuse.164 According to the ACORN study, predatory
lenders systematically rely on banks to deny credit to large num-
bers of low-income individuals;165 they have found their niche.
III. PROPOSAL FOR OCC INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT
OF THE STANDARD
The OCC has broad discretion to interpret and apply the Stan-
dard as it sees fit. As noted by one commentator, the results of the
regulation "will only be known as the examiners roll into banks
and ... give [it] practical definition. ' '166 While there is some com-
fort in having a single federal standard, substitution of the OCC's
Standard to replace state anti-predatory lending laws may have the
negative consequence of reducing access to subprime credit. In or-
der to ameliorate this problem, the OCC should narrowly construe
the Standard so that it only prohibits intentional equity stripping
without preventing legitimate asset-based lending to low-income
borrowers.
Not all risk-priced, asset-based loans should be labeled preda-
tory, and it is important for homeowners to benefit from the equity
in their homes and use it to meet their credit needs. The OCC has
the authority to interpret and apply the Standard as it deems ap-
propriate. The OCC should focus less on how the bank calculated
162. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., Unequal Burden in
Atlanta: Income and Racial Disparities in Subprime Lending (2000), available at
http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelfl8/pressrel/subpratl.html. HUD performed sim-
ilar studies in Baltimore, Los Angeles, New York, and Chicago. Id.
163. See id.; see also OCC Working Paper, supra note 140, at 2.
164. Testimony of Comptroller Hawke, supra note 50.
165. See ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002, supra note 40.
166. Rockett, supra note 109.
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the borrower's eligibility and how heavily the bank relied upon the
borrower's collateral, and instead construe the Standard so that it
prohibits only intentional equity stripping, where the lender had
the requisite bad intent and "an eye out" to take the borrower's
home.
Addressing the difficulties that exist in assessing a bank's intent
in extending a loan, I propose that the OCC take the following
factors into consideration when examining a bank's compliance
with their anti-predatory lending standard:
1. The time lapse before foreclosure.
A relatively short period of time between origination of a loan
and foreclosure may be an indication that the loan was not based
predominantly on the borrower's ability to repay the loan from fu-
ture income, and that the bank relied too heavily on the value of
the borrower's collateral. According to a study documenting
trends in loan foreclosures in Boston, the median age of subprime
loans at foreclosure is three years.167 The OCC should conduct a
similar survey to determine a span of time before foreclosure that
is characteristic of a predatory loan.
2. The forseeability of an interruption to income.
When examining a bank's investigation into the borrower's abil-
ity to repay the loan from future income, the OCC should not hold
the bank responsible for unforeseeable future interruptions to the
borrower's income. The determination should be made based on
the information available to the bank at the time it extended the
loan. Furthermore, the OCC should give deference to the bank's
determination, made before extending the loan, regarding a bor-
rower's ability to repay the loan from his future income. Since
banks co-exist with their customers, they are better able to assess
their customers' present and anticipated future financial situations
than remote federal regulators.
3. Whether the borrower was well informed before entering into
the loan agreement.
As noted earlier, one characteristic that distinguishes predatory
lending from legitimate subprime lending is what happens at
167. See DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN & CHRISTOPHER E. HERBERT, ANALYZING TRENDS
IN SUBPRIME ORGANIZATIONS AND FORECLOSURES: A CASE STUDY OF THE BOSTON
METRO AREA (2000), available at http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/2000804000
192_87267.pdf.
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"ground level" interactions between the borrower and the
lender.168 The OCC should investigate whether the borrower was
informed of, and understood, the terms of the loan. While unso-
phisticated borrowers are not expected to have a comprehensive
understanding of a complex loan agreement, the lender should be
charged with a duty to ensure that the borrower has a basic under-
standing of his obligations under the agreement and the conse-
quences of default. A lender who fails to ensure that the borrower
has this minimal level of understanding is engaging in behavior il-
lustrative of predatory intent. ,
CONCLUSION
The OCC's anti-predatory lending standard, which preempts
state lending laws, places an unjustifiable restriction on the ability
of banks to extend loans to low-income individuals. By restricting
access to legitimate bank loans, application of the Standard may
effectively increase the predatory lending problem outside of the
national banking system, as borrowers are forced to seek credit in
the largely unregulated non-bank lending market, where predatory
lending is rampant. In addition, the efficacy of replacing state anti-
predatory lending laws with a single federal standard is questiona-
ble. The consequences of the regulation depend in large part upon
the OCC's interpretation and enforcement of the Standard. Thus,
the OCC should interpret the Standard so that it does not prohibit
banks from extending loans to all low-income borrowers, and pro-
hibits only those loans extended with an intent to foreclose on the
borrower's collateral.
168. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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